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COMMENT
Estate Liability Under Civil RICO:' Recognizing the
Duality of a Treble Damage Award
I. Introduction
Generally, actions for penalties2 do not survive the death of the alleged
wrongdoer.3 Actions for penalties are designed to punish the wrongdoer
and to deter future misconduct. In this respect, they are analogous to
actions for punitive damages. 4 The purposes behind imposition of penalties
cannot be served if the wrongdoer is dead. That wrongdoer is beyond
punishment; it is not necessary to deter future misconduct.5
Whether a civil RICO action is an action for a penalty and does not
survive the death of the alleged RICO violator is a controversial issue
increasingly faced by courts. A civil RICO action is primarily an action
for treble damages. 6 Thus, in determining whether a civil RICO action
survives, both courts and commentators have focused on the characteri-
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982)). Congress enacted RICO on October
15, 1970, as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. This comment focuses
on the civil treble damages provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
2. See BLAcK's LAw DicTioNaRY 1266 (5th ed. 1979) (defining statutory penalty as "[a
sum of money] which an individual is allowed to recover against a wrongdoer as satisfaction
for wrong or injury suffered, without reference to actual damage sustained").
3. See Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 (1884).
4. Goering, The Characterization of Treble Damages: Conflict Between a Hybrid Mode
of Recovery and Jurisprudence of Labels, in TEcHmNIQIEs IN THE INvwsTIATION AND PRos-
ECuTION OF ORGANIZED Csuia: MArERuAuS ON RICO 428, 434 n.6b (G. Blakey ed. 1980).
For purposes of this comment, analogies drawn between penalties and punitive damages
focus on the like purposes served by these damage awards, namely punishment and deter-
rence. For a detailed discussion of the origins and unique characteristics of the word penalty,
see id. at 458-72.
5. Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1205 (3d Cir. 1989) (punitive damages are not
generally awarded against a decedent); In re GAC Corp., 681 F.2d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir.
1982) (purpose of punitive damages is not met when paid from the wrongdoer's estate);
Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 231 (10th Cir. 1962) (estate cannot be held liable for punitive
damages); Amos v. Prom, 115 F. Supp. 127, 134 (N.D. Iowa 1953) (no exemplary damages
may be awarded against an estate; such damages are a punishment extracted only from the
wrongdoer).
6. Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 1986),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1015 (1987) (treble damage provision is
most significant aspect of a civil RICO action); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Rocky, 646
F. Supp. 194, 195 (N.D. Il1. 1986) (civil RICO claim is best characterized as a treble damage
action); Electronic Relays (India) PVT. Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F. Supp. 648, 651 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (the intent of Congress in adding the civil provisions to RICO was to allow a suit for
treble damages).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
288 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:287
zation of RICO treble damages. Some argue that RICO treble damages
are penal in nature, meant to inflict punishment upon the wrongdoer, and
therefore are not recoverable from the estate of the alleged RICO violator.
7
Others argue that RICO treble damages are remedial in nature, serving
primarily as compensation to the victim and therefore, are recoverable
from the alleged RICO violator's estate.8
The approach taken by courts and commentators confronted with this
issue is to categorize RICO treble damages as either exclusively penal or
exclusively remedial. However, congressional intent that RICO treble dam-
ages effectuate a dual purpose compels the conclusion that these damages
should not be subject to exclusive characterization. 9 RICO treble damages
are meant to serve a. deterrent, penal function, as well as a compensatory,
remedial function. In fact, RICO treble damages have been aptly described
as a type of hybrid damages. 0 Therefore, it is disingenuous to attempt
exclusive categorization of the RICO treble damage provision.
This comment proposes a plain solution which avoids the problems
associated with exclusive characterization of RICO treble damages. In
deciding whether to allow a claim for RICO treble damages to be brought
against an estate, courts should ascertain whether both the penal and
remedial purposes of the treble damage award will be given effect. Simply
put, only when both purposes of RICO's treble damage provision are
served should the action proceed. When either purpose is not served by
the lawsuit, the action should be dismissed.
This comment argues that courts must consider both purposes when
interpreting the RICO treble damage provision. First, the comment searches
for Congress' intent in enacting the civil RICO treble damage provision
to illuminate why courts struggle with its interpretation. Second, the
comment evaluates various interpretative methods employed by the courts
and illustrates how these methods fail to support an exclusive characteri-
zation of RICO treble damages. Third, an examination of case law applying
these interpretative methods reveals that to the extent courts have ignored
the dual nature of RICO treble damages, courts have erroneously applied
these interpretative methods and have achieved wildly inconsistent results.
Finally, an examination of pending legislation directed to reforming the
current civil RICO statute emphasizes that treble damages under RICO do
in fact serve dual purposes. This comment concludes that in the context
7. Summers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (,V.D. Okla. 1984)
(RICO treble damages are essentially penal).
8. State Farm Fir,. & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 682 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (RICO treble damages are remedial and survive death of alleged wrongdoer),
overruled on statute of limitations grounds sub nom. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F.
Supp. 950, 953 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Note, Treble Damages Under RICO: Characterization and
Computation, 61 Nomz DAME L. Rv. 526, 535 n.47 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Characteri-
zation & Computation] (RICO's treble damages are remedial).
9. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
10. Note, Characterization & Computation, supra note 8, at 527 (RICO treble damages
are a hybrid form of damages).
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of estate liability, the penal purposes inherent in a RICO treble damage
award can never be effectuated. The wrongdoer is dead and beyond
punishment. Because both purposes of RICO treble damages are not met,
the action for treble damages against the estate of the RICO violator must
fail.
II. Recovery of Punitive Damages Against Estates of Dead Tortfeasors
A majority of states reject imposition of punitive damages against the
estate of the alleged wrongdoer." These courts view punitive damages as
a monetary penalty imposed on the defendant to punish him and to
discourage others from similar behavior. 12 This rule comports with fairness
and serves the interests of justice. If recovery of punitive damages were
allowed against an estate, as the Florida Supreme Court 13 observed, the
natural extension of this rule would require a decedent's widow and
children to pay a fine or be imprisoned for the decedent's criminal conduct.
Once the wrongdoer is dead, there is no one to punish. 14 To punish
innocent heirs would contravene our basic philosophy of justice."
Of course, a small measure of deterrence might be obtained by punishing
the wrongdoer's estate. With regard to specific deterrence, the tortfeasor
may want to avoid subjecting his innocent heirs to punishment for his
illegal acts. In reality, however, this type of punishment is likely to be so
far removed from the tortfeasor's state of mind at the time the tort is
committed that any deterrence would at best be minimal. It is extremely
unlikely that a would-be tortfeasor contemplates the possibility that his
conduct may reduce the size of his estate.'
6
With regard to general deterrence, actual punishment is a necessary
prerequisite. Advocates of the majority rule, rejecting imposition of pu-
nitive damages against an estate, assert that general deterrence is effec-
tuated only when society witnesses the wrongdoer himself being punished.'
7
11. Comment, Punishing the Dead: Whether the Estates of Dead Tortfeasors Should Be
Responsible for Punitive Damages, 12 U. ARK. LITLE RocK L.J. 283, 284-85 (1990).
A minority of states view punitive damages as serving a compensatory purpose in addition
to punishment and deterrence. This minority allows recovery of punitive damages against
the dead tortfeasor's estate. Punitive damages are thought, by this minority, to compensate
for traditionally noncompensable damages such as attorneys' fees. Id. at 286 & n.15. The
problem with this view, and the reason why it is accepted only by a minority of courts, is
that the focus of punitive damages is on the wrongdoer, not the tort victim and thus,
compensation is not a legitimate concern of punitive damages.
12. Id. at 297-99.
13. Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
14. The ineffectiveness of punishment against the innocent heirs of the wrongdoer's estate
has been used as an analogy in other contexts where the true wrongdoer is beyond punish-
ment. See Professional Asset Management Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 566 F. Supp.
134, 137 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (analogy drawn between ineffectiveness of punishment against
innocent creditors of bank and innocent heirs of estate).
15. Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847.
16. Comment, supra note 11, at 299.
17. Id. at 298-99.
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Therefore, deterrence is not effective when the wrongdoer can no longer
be punished, as in the case of the dead tortfeasor.18 In addition, even
where minimal deterrence may be effectuated, society opposes punishing
the innocent.' 9
The analogy to punitive damages is not faultless. Unlike traditional tort
actions in which punitive damages are recoverable in addition to compen-
satory damages, in the RICO context refusing to allow recovery of treble
damages from the wrongdoer's estate defeats the plaintiff's entire recovery
under the RICO statute. The trebling of RICO damages is mandatory. 20
Therefore, courts must make an all or nothing award and are left with
no discretion to award only actual damages.
2'
III. Civil RICO's Dual Purposes
A. Origins
Congress first introduced RICO as a means to fight organized crime
and prevent its infiltration into legitimate businesses.22 To that end, Con-
gress allowed for a private right of action to be brought under section
1964(c).23 Section 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business
or property by rea;on of a violation of Section 1962 of this chapter may
sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee." 24
Section 1962(b) is violated by "any person25 employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
18. Id.
19. Id. at 295 nn.63, 64.
20. See infra text accompanying note 24.
21. Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 894, 902 n.17 (D.
Utah 1989) (Congress did not split the treble damage provision of § 210 of the Economic
Stabilization Act into two distinct actions, one for compensation and one for punishment,
and there is no legal principle which allows the judiciary to do so).
In the RICO context, at least one court, ignoring the mandate that damages be trebled,
awarded only actual damages and ruled that any recovery under the treble damage provision
in excess of actual damages is penal. See infra text accompanying notes 165-69.
22. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement
of Findings and Purpose).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Congress' declared purpose in adopting the civil RICO
provision was "tlo seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strength-
ening the legal tools in the evidence gathering process and by establishing new penal
prohibitions and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
25. An estate can be sued under RICO. RICO defines a "person" as any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3)
(1982). Courts have held that because an estate is capable of holding a legal interest in
property, the estate of an alleged wrongdoer is within the plain meaning of section 1961(3).
See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/5
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or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.' '26 A pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, defined by section 1961(5), requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity.27 Racketeering activity, defined by section 1961(1), embraces a
wide variety of indictable criminal acts.
28
Congress failed to enumerate the purposes to be served by a civil RICO
action and, more specifically, the purposes to be achieved by a treble
damage award. As one court noted, "With almost no legislative debate
or comment, [RICO] was extended as an afterthought to civil cases to
encourage private suits as a supplement to the efforts of federal law
enforcement agencies." ' 29 As a result, an explosion of case law and com-
mentary has emerged which wrestles with the problems created by Con-
gress' failure to clarify the purposes of the civil RICO treble damage
provision. 0
Interpreting the amorphous language of the RICO treble damage pro-
vision has been an insurmountable source of hostility and frustration
among courts. In many instances, courts have declined to search for
congressional intent and instead have construed RICO both literally and
broadly.3 In addition, the judiciary, understandably critical of the lack
Ind. 1982), overruled on statute of limitations grounds sub nom. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett,
656 F. Supp. 950, 953 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
27. Id. § 1961(5).
28. Id. § 1961(1).
29. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987); Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486-88
(1985); P.M.F. Servs. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 555 (N.D. Il1. 1988); Getzendanner,
Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Does Not Work: It's Time for
Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1990). But see Goldsmith & Linderman,
Civil RICO Reform: The Gatekeeper Concept, 43 VAND. L. REV. 735, 741 (1990) (civil
RICO was not a mere afterthought to criminal RICO, rather Congress gave ample consid-
eration to its formation).
30. The list of commentators addressing civil RICO issues is extensive. See, e.g., Camp-
bell, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation: Racketeer or Businessman?, 36 Sw. L.J.
925 (1982); Case Comment, Civil RICO: Liberally Construed to Effectuate Its Remedial
Purpose, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 1075 (1985); Hellerstein & Mullins, The Likely Insurance
Treatment of Treble Damage RICO Judgments, 42 Bus. LAW. 121 (1986); Long, Treble
Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application
of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DicK. L. REv. 201 (1981); Patton, Civil RICO:
Statutory and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEx. TECH L. REV. 377
(1983); Note, All the Myriad Ways: Accrual of Civil RICO Claims in the Wake of Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 48 LA. L. REV. 1411 (1988); Note, Characterization &
Computation, supra note 8, at 526.
31. See Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 707-08; H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 246 (1989); Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d
898, 903 (2d Cir. 1987); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir.
1985).
1991]
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of legislative history, has called upon Congress to amend the statute.
Courts complain that RICO is too broadly drafted and, in many instances,
provides a windfall for plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, bound by the language of the statute, courts are compelled
to uphold RICO awards. As one court declared, even if it is unlikely that
Congress intended RICO to apply to such a vast gamut of factual circum-
stances, courts are required to "follow where the words of the statute
lead .... [Flederal power inches forward when a statute is left unattended,
whether from Congress' indifference or its acquiescence." 3 2 Thus, not-
withstanding the confusion surrounding the civil RICO treble damage
provision, courts are bound by its ambiguity until Congress acts to amend
the statute.
B. Interpretation
In interpreting the RICO treble damage provision, courts rely upon two
primary sources of congressional intent. First, section 904(a) of title IX
provides: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose." 33 Second, courts derive guidance from
the analogous civil provisions of the Clayton Act, an antitrust statute. 34
Additionally, courts invoke traditional distinctions drawn between penal
statutes and remedial statutes. 35
1. Liberal Construction and Remedial Purposes
For some courts , the sole rationale for concluding that RICO treble
damages are remedial is provided in the language of title IX which man-
dates that RICO be "construed liberally to effectuate its remedial pur-
pose. ' 36 Other courts have concluded that this language does not establish
the remedial character of RICO treble damages.37 Unfortunately, sole
reliance on this language leads courts to conclude automatically that RICO
treble damages have but one purpose, to compensate the victim. This
32. Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1402 (9th Cir.
1986) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Addressing this problem, the Supreme Court has com-
mented: "It is true that private civil actions under the statute are being brought almost
solely against defendants, rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this
defect - if defect it is - is inherent in the statue as written, and its correction must lie
with Congress." Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1984).
33. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,
947.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). For the language of this provision, see infra text accompanying
note 42.
35. This distinction was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Huntington v. Atrill,
146 U.S. 657, 666-69 (1892).
36. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673,
681 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (interpreting congressional purpose of RICO as explicitly remedial),
overruled on statute of limitations grounds sub nom. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F.
Supp. 950, 953 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
37. See, e.g., Summers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (Congress provided for RICO as a whole to be liberally construed in order to




rationale fails to give due credit to the penal function that treble damages
effectuate. As aptly noted by one commentator, viewing RICO's treble
damage provision as primarily compensatory fails to acknowledge that this
provision was enacted to further the war on crime.38 Congress intended
treble damages to do more than just punish businesses operating in vio-
lation of RICO; Congress intended treble damages to actually destroy
those businesses.
39
This comment emphasizes that, notwithstanding the strong tendency
among courts to conclude that the sole purpose of the RICO statute is
remedial, RICO treble damages do have a penal purpose. Other courts
insist that the remedial purpose of RICO treble damages predominates
and therefore the statute's penal purposes should be ignored. These prac-
tices are unfounded. True, Congress did not state that RICO treble dam-
ages are 50% remedial and 50% penal. But neither did Congress state
that RICO treble damages are 90% remedial and 10% penal. What Con-
gress has stated is that RICO treble damages serve both to redress wrongs
to the individual and to deter future wrongs to the public.40 Thus, Con-
gress' desire that RICO treble damages serve two purposes is clear. It
remains, however, for courts to apply the statute consistently, giving effect
to both purposes.
2. Antitrust Precedent
The legislative history of section 1964(c) reveals that Congress relied
heavily on the Clayton Act in enacting the civil RICO provision.41 In fact,
Congress lifted virtually word for word from the Clayton Act the following
language:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States ... and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.42
Consequently, courts called upon to characterize RICO treble damages
have relied extensively on interpretations of the Clayton Act's civil remedy
provision .
43
38. Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Gains Multiplication Approach: An Alternative
Measurement of Damages Under Civil RICO, 33 VaLa. L. Rav. 239, 250 n.56 (1988).
39. Id. at 251.
40. See supra note 23.
41. 116 CONG. REc. 27,739 (1970) (Rep. Steiger's letter to House Judiciary Committee)
(RICO civil enforcement remedy is a "parallel private ... remed[y]" to the Clayton Act);
Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 543-44 (1970) [hereinafter Organized Crime
Control] (testimony of ABA president Edward L. Wright discussing borrowing of Clayton
Act language for private damage provision of RICO).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
43. However, Congress intentionally cast RICO as a separate statute and therefore, while
1991]
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Reliance on antitrust precedent has its pitfalls. Even though Congress
borrowed the language of the RICO treble damage provision from the
Clayton Act, the two statutes serve fundamentally different purposes. The
Clayton Act protects competition in the marketplace. Its thrust is to ensure
market efficiency rather than to protect individual businesses from harm.
RICO, conversely, aims to financially ruin those who engage in criminal
enterprise. 44
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has embraced antitrust precedent in
determining the nature of RICO treble damages.45 Thus, it is beneficial to
review how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clayton Act treble
damage provision and how the Court has analogized interpretation of the
Clayton Act treble damage provision to the RICO treble damage provision.
In American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. ,46
the central issue before the Court was whether a corporation could be
held civilly liable under the antitrust laws for acts of its agents performed
with apparent authority. Hydrolevel, the respondent, marketed a safety
valve device. Ara agent of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) issued an unofficial opinion that Hydrolevel's product was unsafe.
Subsequently, Hydrolevel sued ASME, alleging that ASME's declaration
that the product. was unsafe resulted in market resistance to the product
and was therefore a violation of the Sherman Act.
The Court rejected ASME's argument that treble damages for antitrust
violations are punitive and therefore, under traditional agency law, should
not be imposed upon the principal for the acts of its agent. 47 The Court
conceded that antitrust treble damages serve in part to punish violations
of the antitrust laws.48 However, the Court held that the antitrust private
action is primarily remedial, serving to compensate victims of antitrust
violations.
49
The Court declined to characterize antitrust treble damages as purely
penal or purely remedial. Rather, the Court recognized the hybrid nature
antitrust precedent may provide some guidelines, it is not controlling. After noting that
RICO drew heavily from antitrust remedies, Senator McClellan stated that there was "no
intention.., of importing the great complexity of antitrust law enforcement into this field."
115 CoNo. REc. 9567 (1969). See also Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 512
(1985) (Marshall, J., ceissenting) (Congress did not add to the existing antitrust laws but
instead created a distinct and separate RICO statute).
44. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 473 U.S. 922 (1985); see also Turley,
supra note 38, at 250 (the goal of the Clayton Act is cost minimization in dispensing damages
while the goal of R[CO strives for penalty maximization).
45. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 152 (1987) the
Court stated that the clear legislative intent behind RICO is to pattern its civil enforcement
provision (i.e., its provision for treble damages) on the civil enforcement provision of the
Clayton Act.
46. 456 U.S. 556, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1116 (1982).






of antitrust treble damages and simply stated that private antitrust actions
are primarily, but not solely, remedial. 0
Other decisions by the Court show a reluctance to exclusively characterize
antitrust treble damages and also illuminate the Court's contradictory
resolutions of the issue. In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc.,51 the Court indicated that treble damages under section four of the
Clayton Act are punitive by stating that the concept of treble damages
contemplates punishment and deterrence of unlawful conduct, not en-
hancement of a wrongdoer's liability.5 2
Nevertheless, in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 5 the
Court recognized the hybrid nature of antitrust treble damages, but con-
cluded that the treble damage provision was designed primarily as a
remedy.54 Not surprisingly, the Court's reluctance to exclusively charac-
terize antitrust treble damages has spawned divergent decisions in the lower
courts.
55
In applying antitrust precedent to RICO claims for treble damages, the
Supreme Court reached similar conclusions. In Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Associates,5s the Court explored the similarities of RICO
and the Clayton Act in an attempt to determine whether a uniform statute
of limitations applies in civil RICO actions. In Malley-Duff, an insurance
company ended its relationship with its agent, allegedly due to the agent's
failure to meet a production quota. The agent sued the insurance company
under civil RICO, claiming that the termination of the relationship was
in violation of the statute. The insurance company challenged the agent's
RICO claim on a statute of limitations ground, alleging that the claim
was not timely.
According to the Court, both RICO and the Clayton Act provide for
recovery of treble damages in order to remedy economic injury.5 7 In
addition, both statutes encourage individuals to act as private attorneys
50. Id.
51. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
52. Id. at 639.
53. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
54. Id. at 486-87.
55. Compare Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co, 457 F. Supp. 404, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980) (section 4 of the Clayton Act is not "penal"; trebling of damages is compensatory
in a "special sense" that it insures wrongs do not go unredressed because of difficulty of
proving damages) and Nomand v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649, 657
(W.D. Okla. 1941) ("right of action created by Section 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, is
not penal but remedial.. . .") with Kline v. Caldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 235
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (treble damages are of a statutory punitive
nature); Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 156-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (single damages, not treble damages are recoverable from estates found
liable under § 4 of the Clayton Act) and Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244
F.2d 471, 483 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 833 (1959) (trebling of damages under
antitrust law does not survive; such damages constitute a penalty).
56. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
57. Id. at 151.
1991]
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general. The prospect of recovering treble damages furnishes private in-
dividuals with a strong incentive to prosecute criminals, thus enhancing
public prosecutorial resources, which are inadequate to deal with all facets
of organized crime.
58
After setting the stage for application of Clayton Act principles to
RICO, the Court concluded that the appropriate statute of limitations for
civil RICO is the four-year period applied in antitrust cases.5 9 The similarity
of federal policies underlying both RICO and the Clayton Act justifies
the selection of the four-year statute of limitations for Clayton Act actions
as the most appropriate limitations period for RICO actions. 60 More
generally, the similarities between RICO and the Clayton Act justify the
Court's reliance on antitrust precedent in the RICO context.
In Shearson/Anterican Express, Inc. v. McMahon,61 the Court again
compared RICO to the Clayton Act. This time, the Court examined
whether a RICO claim is arbitratible pursuant to an arbitration agreement
between a broker and its customers. The customers argued that the public
interest in the enforcement of RICO precluded submitting the RICO claim
to arbitration.
The Court emphasized that in the antitrust context, the compensatory
function of treble damages predominates over the deterrent function. 2 In
the Court's view, the legislative history of the RICO treble damage pro-
vision reveals the same emphasis on the remedial role of the treble damage
provision as does the Clayton Act treble damage provision.63 Furthermore,
the penal aspect of civil RICO, although important, is secondary."
Although the Supreme Court has continuously emphasized the primacy
of RICO's treble damage provision, it has also refused to exclude cate-
gorically the possibility that treble damages also serve as a penalty. Thus,
RICO litigants are not precluded from arguing that treble damages in fact
serve a penal function.
3. Penal v. Remedial Statutes: The Murphy Test
A third interpretative mechanism courts have employed to characterize
RICO treble damages is a test designed to determine whether a statute
imposes a penalty or provides a remedy. This test encompasses aspects of
both means of interpretation discussed above.
Statutes imposing a penalty and statutes providing a remedy are distin-
guished by employing a test first introduced by the Supreme Court in
58. Id. See also Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (legislative
history of RICO reveals reliance on Clayton Act model).
59. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 156.
60. Id.
61. 482 U.S. 220, rh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
62. Id. at 240 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
63. Shearson/Arnerican, 482 U.S. at 240.




Huntington v. Attrill.65 Huntington determined that whether a law is penal
depends upon whether recovery under the statute goes to the public or
goes to a private individual.
66
Although this test appears quite simple on its face, its application has
led to inconsistent, unpredictable and even erroneous conclusions. Part of
this confusion can be attributed to Murphy v. Household Financial Corp.,67
a case in which the Sixth Circuit attempted to reduce the Huntington test
to three factors. In effect, however, the Murphy court rewrote the test,
adding components entirely absent in the Huntington opinion. 6
The Murphy court reconstructed the Huntington test as follows. To
determine whether a statute is penal, courts must conduct a three part
inquiry: (1) whether the purpose of the statute is to redress individual
wrongs or more general wrongs to the public; (2) whether recovery under
the statute runs to the individual or to the public; and (3) whether the
recovery authorized by the statute is wholly disproportionate to the harm
suffered.
69
Each of the Murphy test's three factors is explained below to illustrate
whether each factor contributes to resolution of the issue of the proper
characterization of RICO treble damages. After examining each prong of
the test, this comment explores the application of the Murphy test in the
context of RICO treble damage actions and in the context of other federal
statutes allowing recovery of treble damages.
a) Wrongs to the Individual Versus Wrongs to the Public
The first prong of the Murphy test asks whether the purpose of the
statute is to redress individual wrongs or public wrongs. Under this prong,
if the statute redresses public wrongs, it is penal. Alternatively, if the
statute redresses individual wrongs, it is remedial. Because the RICO treble
damage provision serves both of these purposes, this first prong acknowl-
edges the dual nature of RICO treble damages. However, result-oriented
courts have concluded that application of this factor establishes that an
exclusive characterization of RICO treble damages is possible.
As noted earlier, Congress intended the treble damage award under
RICO to serve as an incentive to private individuals to bring suit and,
thus, to serve as "private attorneys general. ' 70 That Congress recognized
the dual private/public nature of the RICO treble damage provision is
65. 146 U.S. 657 (1982).
66. Id. at 666-69 (emphasis in original).
67. 560 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1977).
68. One justification for the Murphy court's imposition of additional factors to determine
whether a statute imposes a penalty or a remedy is that modern social welfare-type legislation
was unknown at the time of the Huntington opinion. See Porter v. Household Fin. Corp.,
385 F. Supp. 336, 342 (S.D. Ohio 1974) ("[mlany developments have occurred in both case
and statutory law since the time of the development of the common law governing the
survival of actions for penalties").
69. Murphy, 560 F.2d at 209.
70. See supra text accompanying note 58.
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nowhere more evident than in the statute's legislative history. According
to Representative John Conyers, "[RICO's] essential purpose was to help
underresourced public prosecutors by giving citizens a 'private attorney
general function' -- the right to sue crooks and cheats that defraud them
for treble damages."' 7 First, the fact that individuals help combat crime,
a law enforcement function which benefits the public, recognizes the penal
nature of RICO treble damages.72 Second, the fact that the individual
bringing the action personally recovers for injuries sustained speaks to the
private, remedial nature of RICO treble damages.
7 3
Obvious support for the assertion that the private attorney general notion
recognizes the dual function of RICO treble damages can be found from
a review of the cae law. In numerous contexts, courts employ the private
attorney general rationale to support both the argument that treble dam-
ages are penal and the argument that treble damages are remedial.
Bowles v. Farmers National Bank"4 furnishes an example. In that case,
the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration sued the estate
of the defendant to recover treble damages for violations of the Emergency
Price Control Act (EPCA). The defendant allegedly made six sales of
whiskey in excess of the ceiling price. The Administrator claimed that the
EPCA was remedial and therefore did not abate with the death of the
liable party. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, however, and held that the treble
damage provision of the EPCA, which encourages private individuals to




In Porter v. Household Finance Corp.,76 the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio reached the exact opposite result. In Porter, the
71. 133 CoNa. Rac. E4258-59 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
Speaking to the purposes of the civil RICO action, one commentator stated:
The provision for a private civil remedy in the statute was designed to provide
a supplementary way to enforce its basic purposes and to add substantial
private resources to the enforcement of the criminal law. Thus, the commonly
accepted rationale for the private civil RICO action is that it serves to convert
the individual plaintiff, attracted by the incentive of treble damages, into a
private attorney general who can enforce the RICO statute's prohibition against
criminal conduct in a civil lawsuit.
Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1989).
72. See, e.g., 136 CoNG. REc. E2086 (daily ed. June 21, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Hughes) (main goal in allowing private civil RICO actions is to spark public interest by
allowing citizens to act as private attorneys general); Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 519 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Congress' concern under RICO is for
competitors and investors in the marketplace, not for direct victims whose redress is found
under existing state and federal laws); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 653 (1985) (treble damage actions brought by private individuals are
primary aid in both enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring potential violators).
73. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673,
681 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (RICO treble damages serve as a private enforcement mechanism,
encouraging the victim to bring suit), overruled on statute of limitations grounds sub nom.
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F. Supp. 950, 953 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
74. 147 F.2d 425 (6Sth Cir. 1945).
75. Id. at 430.




trustee of a bankruptcy estate sought treble damages under the Truth-in-
Lending Act (TILA) from the defendant for failure to make disclosures
required by the Act.
To decide whether the bankrupt individual's cause of action passed to
the trustee, it was necessary for the court to first determine whether the
Act was penal or remedial. The court held that TILA is remedial as
indicated by the legislative intent to allow excess damages as a means of
encouraging debtors to seek their remedy under the Act.
77
This same private attorney general argument has been advanced in the
antitrust context in recognition of the dual function of the Clayton Act
treble damage provision.78 According to the Report of the Attorney Ge-
neral's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 79 the carrot of
treble damages is no longer necessary to encourage suits by injured persons.
Procedural and substantive law, largely favorable to the plaintiff, coupled
with the award of attorneys' fees, provide sufficient incentive to individuals
to bring private antitrust actions.A0 The fact that individuals have adequate
incentive to sue even without treble damages implicitly recognizes the
punitive nature of treble damages.
Likewise, the procedural and substantive law under RICO is largely
favorable to plaintiffs. Minimal standards of proof are afforded the
plaintiff bringing a civil RICO action.81 The plaintiff need prove his civil
RICO case by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 2 These minimal
burdens clearly favor the plaintiff.83 Furthermore, as with antitrust actions,
77. Id. at 342-43.
78. Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31
(1969) (treble damages provision of antitrust law serves private law enforcement function)
with Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (purpose of antitrust treble damages
provision is to deter violators, deprive them of their illegal profits, and provide ample
compensation to victims).
79. U.S. ATT'Y GEN.'s NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT (1955).
80. Id. at 379. See also Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, 172 F.2d 37, 43 (Ist Cir.
1948) (proof of loss under the antitrust laws has become so lenient as to require nothing
more than speculation).
81. See Organized Crime Control, supra note 41, at 664 (statement of Rep. Poff) (more
lenient burden of proof under the civil-remedy section than under criminal remedy section);
Turley, supra note 38, at 243-44 (civil RICO plaintiffs have low threshold requirements for
proving pattern of racketeering). Addressing this same point, Rep. Fred Boucher commented:
The pleading requirements [of civil RICO] are so minimal that virtually any
contract dispute becomes a candidate for civil RICO jurisdiction. If the plaintiff
alleges the existence of a contract dispute and can demonstrate that the mails
or the telephone were used on several occasions either in forming or breaching
the contract ... the pleading requirements for a civil RICO case are met.
135 CoNO. REc. E460 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
82. United States v. Local 560 of the Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279-80 n.12
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131,
133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
83. As one court properly explained:
mo the extent a difficulty of proof exists, courts have recognized it and have
dealt with it by imposing a somewhat lenient standard of proof for damages
actually suffered. We doubt the courts would have made this accommodation
if Congress intended the treble damage provision to rectify a difficulty of
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attorneys' fees are recoverable under RICO's section 1964(c). Minimal
proof requirements coupled with recovery of attorneys' fees should provide
adequate incentive to the plaintiff. Considered together, these two points
illustrate that treble damages are viewed, at least in part, as punitive and
not solely remedial. Actual damages plus attorneys' fees would adequately
compensate the plaintiff.
The private attorney general rationale for imposing treble damages,
therefore, does not rule out the possibility that treble damages are both
penal and remedial. Private enforcement actions as a means of deterring
conduct that is "publicly" undesirable fail to conclusively establish that
RICO treble damages are exclusively remedial or exclusively penal. Thus,
this component of the Murphy test acknowledges the duality of treble
damages.
Examination of the first factor of the Murphy test illustrates the folly
of arguing that this factor conclusively establishes that RICO treble dam-
ages are solely remedial. Rather, this factor acknowledges that most treble
damage provisions, including RICO's section 1964(c), serve dual purposes.
b) To Whom Recovery Is Directed
The second prong of the Murphy test asks whether recovery under the
statute runs to the aggrieved individual or to the public. This component
of the three part test clearly derives from the Supreme Court's decision
in Huntington.
Recently, at least one court insisted that this second factor of the Murphy
test is the sole determinant in deciding the proper characterization of a
federal statute which authorizes recovery of treble damages.84 Other courts
have argued that sole reliance on this factor fails to acknowledge that at
the time Huntington was decided, social welfare type legislation was
unknown." Other cases decided since Huntington have recognized that
even if recovery runs to an individual, a statute still can have penal
purposes.86 This second factor poses the greatest difficulty for those courts
proof.
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 894, 904 (D. Utah 1989) (citations
omitted). However, opposite views have been taken: "[S]ince civil RICO will almost always
be based on allegations of fraud, plaintiff's complaint must satisfy the stringent pleading
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) which provides in pertinent part, 'in
all averments of fraud ... circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with
particularity."' Patton, supra note 30, at 401-02.
84. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 894, 900 (D. Utah 1989)
(the federal penaity characterization is dependent upon to whom the causi of action is
given).
85. Porter v. Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 342 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (the statute,
in keeping with modern social welfare legislation, has a dual purpose of remedying harm to
the individual and deterring business practices which are detrimental to society).
86. See, e.g., Electronic Relays (India) PVT. Ltd. v. Pascente, 610 F. Supp. 648, 652
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (a statute can have a remedial purpose yet contain specific provisions that




attempting to exclusively characterize RICO treble damages as penal. 87
Unlike the other Murphy factors, this factor is inflexible. Courts cannot
shape this factor to reach a desired result. The statute either authorizes
recovery to the individual or does not.
The unyielding nature of this factor fails to acknowledge that treble
damages serve a dual function. Thus, this factor is insufficient as a means
of classifying treble damages as strictly remedial. These excessive damages
undeniably serve a dual function by both punishing the wrongdoer and
compensating the victim. The problem with this factor of the Murphy test
is that it attempts to substitute labels for analysis. Discussing this problem
in the antitrust context, commentators have suggested that because a treble
damage provision offers both compensation and punishment, a proper
analysis strikes a balance between these two goals.88
c) Whether Recovery is Disproportionate to the Harm
The final prong of the Murphy test asks whether the recovery authorized
by the statute is wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered. This inquiry
is the sole factor which examines the effect of the treble damage award.
Because this factor asks whether recovery is disproportionate, it implicitly
recognizes the punitive potential of treble damages.
Some courts have held that statutes are remedial despite enhanced
punitive-type damage provisions. 9 A closer look at these cases, however,
reveals only that damages awarded in excess of actual damages do not
transform a remedial statute into a statute for a penalty.9° Nonetheless,
these cases do not refute the notion that statutes awarding excess damages
serve dual purposes. 9' The third factor of the Murphy test does not purport
to exclusively classify statutory excess damage awards as penal. Rather, it
asks whether the damages are disproportionate to the harm suffered. It is
an effect-oriented inquiry.
Other courts have invoked the argument advanced in the antitrust context
that treble damages are not disproportionate to the harm suffered because
right of action to the individual are remedial and are not transformed into penal statutes
merely because the individual is authorized to recover an amount in excess of actual damages).
87. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1141 n.47 (5th Cir. 1988) (the fact that
recovery under § 1964(c) runs to the individual suggests the statute is not penal), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 918, vacated on other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914
(1989).
88. Hellerstein & Mullins, supra note 30, at 126.
89. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distribs., 6 F.2d 1000, 1009 (2d Cir.
1925) (if recovery runs to the individual, a statute is remedial regardless of whether it limits
recovery to actual loss or allows recovery in excess of actual loss).
90. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 156 (1899).
91. In Brady, the Court stated: "Although punishment, in a certain and very limited
sense, may be the result of the [antitrust] statute before us so far as the wrongdoer is
concerned, yet we think it clear such is not its chief purpose .... ." Brady, 175 U.S. at 156.
Regardless of whether punishment is the chief purpose, or a secondary purpose, Brady
acknowledges the dual nature of the antitrust treble damage award.
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treble damages serve as liquidated damages, ensuring that the individual
is made whole.92 The liquidated damages rationale may suffice where
Congress has explicitly denominated that excess damage provisions shall
serve as liquidated damages. 93 However, where Congress has failed to
explicitly denominate that excess damage provisions shall serve as liqui-
dated damages, this argument is wholly without merit. The same uncer-
tainty that attends the determination of whether Congress intended RICO
treble damages to be penal or remedial also inheres in attempts to determine
whether Congress intended RICO treble damages to serve as liquidated
damages.
In addition, the antitrust argument that treble damages serve to remedy
intangible, accumulative harm94 is not as convincing in the RICO context.
As one group of commentators points out, the long-term economic effects
caused by antitrust violations are not present in the vast majority of cases
involving RICO claims. 95 Although both antitrust and RICO violations
may significantly harm the plaintiff's business, a RICO violation does not
create the long-term market displacements which accompany antitrust
violations. 96
The majority of RICO violations involve various allegations of fraud.97
Statistical data reveal that RICO violations typically exist in the business
and commercial setting, with only 9% of these violations involving criminal
activity.98 While the criminal activity would create long-term market dis-
placements justifying imposition of treble damages as a means of liqui-
dating uncertain, a.ccumulative harm, the damages under the typical RICO
claim, alleging fraud, are ascertainable. 99
Finally, the mere uncertainty of damages alone does not justify permit-
ting excess damages. In other contexts where damages are uncertain, the
plaintiff has been limited to actual damages. For example, in cases of libel
and slander per se, substantial damages are awarded to the injured party,
even in the absence of provable pecuniary harm.°0 Therefore, the argument
92. See, e.g., Martin Oil Serv., Inc. v. Koch Ref. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1334, 1363 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (recovery of treble damages under the antitrust laws ensures that plaintiffs are
made whole).
93. See BrooklyrSav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 699 n.l, 707 (1945) ("[a]ny employer
who violates ... [the Fair Labors Standard Act of 1938] shall be liable to the employee
... in the amount of this] unpaid minimum wages ... and in an additional equal amount
as liquidated damages") (emphasis added).
94. Goering, supra note 4, at 503-04.
95. Boyle, Naughton & Ween, Coverage of RICO Claims Under a Directors' and Officers'
Policy: Are Treble Damages Covered?, 381 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE/COMMERCIAL LAW
AND PRACTICE HANDBCOK SERIES DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE AND SELF
INSURANCE 497, 520-21 (1986).
96. Id. at 520-21 & n.12.
97. Id. at 520 n.12.,
98. Id.
99. Id. at 520-21.
100. See Note, Government Corruption and Civil RICO: Providing Compensation for




that Congress intended RICO treble damages to be exclusively remedial
because of the difficulty in ascertaining the extent of harm caused by a
RICO violation lacks merit.
IV. Applying the Murphy Test
As noted above, under the Murphy test courts are required to balance
three factors. One of the factors must tip the scale in favor of the desired
result, thus underscoring the dual nature of treble damages. Naturally,
courts which conclude that RICO treble damages are remedial rely on the
first two Murphy factors. As discussed, these first two factors focus on
the notion that (1) RICO treble damages redress wrongs to the individual
and (2) recovery under RICO runs to the individual. 10
However, courts which conclude that RICO treble damages are remedial
have difficulty reconciling the third Murphy factor, which addresses the
disproportionate relationship between the harm suffered and the damages
awarded. 0 2 This problem arises because frequently treble damages under
RICO do provide a windfall to the plaintiff and therefore are dispropor-
tionate to the harm suffered. Observing that under the Clayton Act judges
are reluctant to permit recovery where treble damages serve as a penalty
and provide a windfall to the plaintiff, one commentator noted that the
treble damage feature is an enforcement provision and superimposes a
penalty upon compensation.0 3 Thus, there must be a limit on literal
construction where unreasonable results would be reached.'0
4
Conversely, courts which conclude that RICO treble damages are penal
rely primarily on this third factor and emphasize the disproportionate
effects of a RICO treble damage award. 05 These courts have the most
trouble reconciling the first Murphy factor, namely, that recovery runs to
the individual. To tip the scale in favor of characterizing the treble damage
award as a penalty, however, these courts look to the second factor. They
argue that while treble damages redress wrongs to the individual, they also
redress public wrongs.'06
The divergent results reached by courts attempting to balance the Mur-
phy factors highlight the inadequacy of exclusive characterizations in civil
RICO. As the District Court for the Central District of California suc-
cinctly pointed out in In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage
Pool Certificates Securities Litigation,0 7 as with antitrust treble damages,
there is no clear cut distinction in the cases as to whether RICO treble
damages are penal or remedial. 08
101. See supra text accompanying notes 71-88.
102. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 130, 188-89.
103. Note, Standing to Sue in Antitrust: The Application of Data Processing to Private
Treble Damage Actions, 11 TULSA L.J. 542, 552 (1976) (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. See discussion of cases infra text accompanying notes 131-61.
106. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
107. 636 F. Supp. 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
108. Id. at 1155; see also Ethicon, Inc. v. Aetna, 737 F. Supp. 1320, 1335 (S.D.N.Y.
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A. Decisions on Estate Liability Under RICO
Addressing the issue of whether an estate can be assessed treble damages
for the deceased wrongdoer's RICO violations, one commentator con-
cluded that a RICO action should survive the death of the alleged wrong-
doer.' °9 While recognizing that the treble damage provision of RICO has
multiple purposes,"10 this commentator insisted on focusing on the pri-
marily remedial language of the statute. Accordingly, she stated that based
on legislative history, Congress intended RICO not to provide a means
for punishing the defendant, but rather to provide a remedy for the
plaintiff."'
Somewhat inconsistently, this same commentator emphasized that in
resolving civil RICO issues, courts should keep the multiple purposes of
treble damages in mind. Only when these multiple purposes are addressed
can the broad, far-reaching intent of Congress be accomplished." 2 While
recognizing that RICO treble damages serve multiple purposes, this scholar
failed to acknowledge these multiple purposes. Instead, she cursorily con-
cluded that RICO claims survive the defendant's death because RICO is
a remedial measure meant to encourage private citizens to bring suit and
to assure victims full compensation for their injury."13
Finally, this commentator insisted that recovery of treble damages in a
civil RICO action is neither compensatory nor punitive in nature." 4 Quite
the contrary is true, however. A civil RICO treble damage action is in
fact both compensatory and punitive.'
1990) (neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court has directly stated whether antitrust
treble damages are punitive).
109. Note, Characterization & Computation, supra note 8, at 535.
110. Id. at 533-34. Treble damages serve to (1) encourage private individuals to sue, (2)
deter future violators, and (3) compensate victims for accumulative harm. The commentator
stated: "[C]ourts should attempt to secure the three interests of RICO's treble damages
without sacrificing any one element or frustrating the statutory scheme of RICO." Id. at
534 n.43.
11. Id. at 547.
112. Id. at 534.
113. Id. at 535. But see U.S. ATT'Y GEN.'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS,
REPORT 379 (1955) (mandatory trebled damages are no longer necessary to encourage suits
by direct victims).
114. Id. at 535. Some commentators have refused to recognize the penal nature of treble
damages by stating that treble damages are distinct from punitive damages. See, e.g., Blakey
& Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various
Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God - Is This the End of RICO?," 43 VAND. L. REV.
851, 919 (1990) (treble damages compensate for accumulative harm, and therefore, are not
penal); Hellerstein & Mullins, supra note 30, at 132 (RICO treble damages are substantially
different from common law punitive damages). While the author recognizes that punitive
damages are distinct from treble damages (e.g., treble damages require no showing of wilful
conduct and are not discretionary), the author contends that the deterring and punishing
aspects of punitive damages are an integral part of a treble damage award.




This commentator addresses the issue of survivability by stating an
approach and determining the opposite. Conceding that multiple purposes
are served by a RICO treble damage award, the commentator nonetheless
concludes that only the remedial aspect of the award will be honored.
1 6
Furthermore, the commentator's reliance on the private attorney general
notion as a mandate that RICO treble damage actions are remedial and
survive is ill-founded." 7 The purposes of this award are dual. Ignoring
this duality is unjustified.
Although there is limited case law on the issue of whether an estate can
be held liable for treble damages, the issue has been addressed in the
context of RICO violations as well as other federal statutes which authorize
excess damage awards. The cases discussed below illustrate the manner in
which courts shape the Murphy test and choose among various interpre-
tations of civil RICO's purpose in order to reach the result desired. In
some instances, the result is correct because the dual purpose of RICO
treble damages is achieved. However, the rationale employed by these
courts is incorrectly focused. The cases illustrate how courts attempt to
exclusively label the RICO treble damage provision as either remedial or
penal. In addition, these cases illustrate how the courts fail to consider
the effects of the damage award so as to insure that both purposes are
achieved.
Two cases frequently cited on the issue of whether RICO treble damages
are recoverable from an estate are State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Estate of Caton"8 and Summers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.19 The
results, if not the rationales, of these two cases have spurred RICO
reform.
20
In Caton, the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana con-
cluded that because a civil RICO action is remedial, it survives the death
of the alleged wrongdoer, and therefore treble damages are recoverable
from an estate.' 2 ' In Caton, one of the RICO defendants had been mur-
dered. His estate argued that the action for treble damages under RICO
did not survive the death of the alleged wrongdoer. The estate's argument
depended upon a ruling that the treble damage provision is penal in nature
and that, as a general rule, actions for penalties do not survive the
wrongdoer's death.'2
116. Note, Characterization & Computation, supra note 8, at 535.
117. The attorney general rationale has continuously been used as a justification that
treble damages benefit the public and therefore, serve, at least in part, as a penalty. See
supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
118. 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1982), overruled on statute of limitations grounds sub
nom. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F. Supp. 950, 953 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
119. 592 F. Supp. 1240 (W.D. Okla. 1984). Summers did not involve the issue of whether
an estate can be held liable for punitive damages but it has been cited so often as support
for that conclusion that the author has chosen to analyze it here.
120. See generally Blakey & Perry, supra note 114, at 955.
121. Caton, 540 F. Supp. at 682.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
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In reaching its conclusion, the court first compared the treble damage
provision of RICO with section 4 of the Clayton Act. The court noted
that while the treble damage provision of the Clayton Act has been held
to be penal, RICO's section 1964(c) was intentionally cast as a separate
statute in order to avoid restrictive precedent of antitrust case law. 23
Having freed itself from antitrust precedent, the Caton court concluded
that Congress denominated RICO treble damages as remedial. 24 The court
primarily relied on language found in section 904(a) of title IX which
provides: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose."'2 The Caton court determined that Con-
gress explicitly denominated RICO remedial and, therefore, concluded that
it was bound by statutory direction.
2 6
Although the Caton court primarily relied on the statutory language,
the court also applied the Murphy test'2 7 to reach its conclusion. Addressing
the first factor (whether the purpose of the action is to redress individual
wrongs or public wrongs), the court concluded that the statute plainly
provides redress for wrongs suffered by the individual. 28 Underscoring the
significance of the second factor (whether recovery under the statute runs
to the individual), the court held that recovery runs to the individual and
is obviously meant to make him whole. 2 9 The court had difficulty, how-
ever, with the third factor (whether the treble damage award is dispro-
portionate to the harm suffered). While recognizing that the treble damage
provision might lead one to conclude that the award is wholly dispropor-
tionate to the haxm, the court explained that treble damages serve to
liquidate uncertain actual damages and to encourage private individuals
to bring suit.30
The court's decision amplifies the major flaw that this Comment iden-
tifies. Caton attempted to exclusively classify RICO treble damages as
"remedial," thus falling to acknowledge the dual purposes to be served
by RICO treble damages. Furthermore, Caton was unable to adequately
explain the fact that the treble damage provision is disproportionate to
the harm suffered.
123. Caton, 540 F. Supp. at 673, 680. The Caton court had to free itself from antitrust
precedent due to an earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit which held that treble damages are
in the nature of a penalty for the public wrong. See Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of
Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957).
124. Caton, 540 F. Supp. at 681.
125. Id. (quoting If: U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)).
126. Id.
127. Caton borrowed the three part test from Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Fin.
Corp., 615 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1980). This test is identical to the Murphy test and asks: (1)
whether the purpose of the action is to redress individual wrongs or wrongs to the public;
(2) whether recovery rans to the individual or to the public; and (3) whether the authorized
recovery is wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered. Id. at 414.






Caton fails to comport with the notions of duality present in a RICO
treble damage action. The court allowed recovery against an estate when
punishment against the wrongdoer could no longer be effectuated.
In contrast to Caton, Summers held that RICO treble damages are
penal. 31 In Summers, as in Caton, the issue before the court was whether
RICO treble damages are penal. However, the context in which this issue
arose in Summers did not involve survivability. In Summers, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver of a defunct bank,
moved to strike the plaintiff's claim for treble damages under RICO. The
FDIC relied on a previous ruling of the Summers court which had deter-
mined that punitive damages could not be assessed against the FDIC as a
receiver of a failed bank.
3 2
Agreeing that RICO treble damages are penal, the court refused to allow
these damages to be recovered from the FDIC. 33 To reach this result, the
court relied on case law holding that treble damages under section 4 of
the Clayton Act are penal and therefore should not be assessed against
the estate of a deceased wrongdoer. 34 Such actions, the court reasoned,
survive only for actual, not treble, damages.
35
Applying the Murphy test, the court found that the purpose of the
treble damage provision is essentially penal. 36 First, the court noted that
Congress found racketeering to be primarily public, not private, because
it drains resources from the economy and undermines the general wel-
fare. 37 The public nature of racketeering suggests that RICO treble dam-
ages are punitive. 38 The court conceded that recovery under RICO runs
to the individual, a factor suggesting that the statute is remedial. 39 How-
ever, the court did not find this second factor to be conclusive.140 Applying
the third factor, the court found that damages under RICO are wholly
disproportionate to the injury.' 4' Relying on the two Murphy factors which
indicated that RICO treble damages are penal, Summers concluded that
RICO treble damages could not be assessed against the FDIC.
142
Unlike Caton, Summers properly noted that Congress has never explicitly
denominated RICO's treble damages as "remedial."' 43 Rather, all Congress
did provide is that RICO as a whole "shall be liberally construed to
131. Summers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
132. Professional Asset Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 566 F. Supp. 134
(W.D. Okla. 1983).
133. Summers, 592 F. Supp. at 1243.
134. Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealer's Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118, 156-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
135. Summers, 592 F. Supp. at 1242.
136. Id. at 1243.
137. Id. at 1242.
138. Id. at 1243.
139. Id. at 1242.
140. Id.
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effectuate its remedial purposes."' 144 Summers reasoned that this language
does not necessarily imply that the treble damage provision is wholly
remedial.
14
Most importantly, Summers properly recognized that "RICO cannot
fairly be characterized in toto as either penal or remedial; instead, it must
be analyzed seriatim."146 Thus, to date, Summers is one of the few courts
to correctly recognize the hybrid nature of RICO treble damages.
In effect, Summers' recognition that each RICO case should be analyzed
"seriatim" suggests that the holding of the court is very limited. The court
reached its conclusion by looking at the facts of the case before it, stating
that "it would be plainly unjust to permit [a treble damages award] against
the receiver, for innocent depositors and creditors would be punished, not
the putative wrongdoer, the bank.'
' 47
Summers should be commended for its realistic treatment of the char-
acterization problems accompanying a claim for RICO treble damages.
Case law and commentary which rely on Summers as authority for the
proposition that RICO treble damages are penal are in error. The Summers
court itself explicitly limited its holding that an award of treble damages
would have a penal effect to the case before it.148
Although Summers reached the proper result, the court employed a
faulty rationale in reaching its conclusion. Summers held that the treble
damage award is penal because innocent parties are punished. However,
it is precisely because the wrongdoer is not punished that the damage
award fails to effectuate its penal purpose. 49 Therefore, the dual purposes
of RICO treble damages are not satisfied.
An analysis similar to that followed in Summers can be found in Massey
v. City of Oklahoma City. 0 In Massey, the District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma held that corrupt city officials can be sued in their
individual capacity and held liable for treble damages under RICO, but
that such a suit does not lie against a municipality.'' Citing Summers,
the court recognized the punitive nature of treble damages.5 2 Public policy,
the court concluded, dictates that innocent taxpayers should not be pe-
nalized for the wrongdoings of a corrupt city official.'
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (court's emphasis).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. A contrary opinion is taken by one commentator who believes that the Caton court
erroneously based its holding on the characterization of treble damages. "RICO's treble
damages are remedial. They should not survive against the receiver of a defunct bank
because, as between two innocent parties - the plaintiff and the receiver - the receiver
should not bear the burden of the loss." Note, Characterization & Computation, supra note
8, at 535 n.47.
150. 643 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
151. Id. at 86-87.
152. Id. at 86.




Massey illustrates the principle advocated here: where the dual purposes
of a treble damage award cannot be effectuated, the claim for treble
damages will fail. Because the true guilty party is not punished, these dual
purposes fail to be accomplished. The remedial goal of compensation is
served, but the penal goal of punishment is not.
Both Summers and Massey focus on the innocence of the party against
whom recovery is sought. Consideration of this factor is inappropriate
when deciding whether to award treble damages. Treble damages do not
require a showing of willful or intentional conduct on the part of the
alleged wrongdoer. 5 4 Therefore, the innocence of the defendant is irrele-
vant.
In Illinois, the federal courts have consistently held that because RICO
treble damages are penal, an action seeking RICO treble damages cannot
be brought against an estate. For example, in First Interstate Bank of
Nevada, N.A. v. National Republic Bank of Chicago,155 the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois had to determine whether the plaintiffs'
RICO claims were extinguished by the defendant's death. The estate was
being sued for the decedent's alleged involvement in a securities fraud
conspiracy. The court concluded that RICO's treble damage provision is
primarily penal and, therefore, does not survive the death of the defen-
dant.1 5
6
Like other courts which have applied the Murphy test,' 57 the court
conceded that the second factor (whether recovery runs to the individual
or to the public) suggests that RICO's treble damage provision serves a
remedial purpose.158 Applying the first factor of the test, however, the
court found that Congress intended treble damages not primarily as com-
pensation, a purpose that would be served by actual damages, but rather
as deterrence and punishment.'59
Recognizing that the Caton court had reached the opposite conclusion,
the court insisted that the congressional purpose in allowing treble damages
is to protect the public welfare by over-motivating victims to bring suit
against the mob. 160 By encouraging victims to sue, treble damages accom-
plish the goal of assisting the notably limited number of government
officers available to combat organized crime. 61 Finally, applying the third
Murphy factor (whether recovery is disproportionate to the harm suffered),
the court concluded that RICO treble damages are unlimited and provide
a windfall to the individual harmed. 62
154. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 894, 904 (S.D.
Utah 1989) (penalties are meant to punish individuals for committing socially undesirable
acts and do not require that the actor have an evil state of mind).
155. No. 80-C-6401 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1985) (WESTLAW, Allfeds).
156. Id., slip op. at 4-5.
157. The court relied on the test found in Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Fin. Corp.,
615 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1980). See supra note 127 and accompanying text.




162. Id. For other Illinois court opinions holding that RICO treble damages are penal,
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Recently, in Costello v. Cooper,163 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York refused to accept the defendant's
argument that a cause of action under RICO abates upon the death of a
plaintiff.'" In Costello, the plaintiff sued the defendant in an action
involving a read estate fraud scheme. Although recognizing that RICO
treble damages are in part punitive, the court insisted that treble damages
are largely remedial because they ensure that wrongs will be compensated
for in light of the recognized difficulties in ascertaining actual damages. 6
It is critical to note that the issue in Costello was whether the action
should abate due to the death of the plaintiff, not the defendant. Although
the reasoning employed by the court is flawed, its conclusion is sound.
Because the focus of penal damages is on the defendant, not the plaintiff,
there is no reason why the action for treble damages should not survive
the death of the. plaintiff. In such cases, the punitive purpose of treble
damages as well as the compensatory purpose of treble damages can be
served.
In Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.,166 the Fifth Circuit had to determine
whether RICO damages are compensatory or penal. Even though the case
did not involve estate liability, the opinion is worth discussing because of
its unique approach to the problem of characterizing RICO treble damages.
In Abell, defendants, developers of property, were accused of RICO
violations for securities fraud and mail and wire fraud relating to the
issuance of bonds. The court had to determine whether an award of RICO
treble damages would constitute duplicative relief under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. If treble damages under RICO were remedial, the
award would be duplicative. 67
The court decided that the portion of RICO damages in excess of actual
damages is penal. 68 The court reasoned that had Congress merely wanted
to make RICO plaintiffs whole, it would have limited recovery of civil
RICO damages to the actual damages suffered. 169 The court concluded
that Congress trebled RICO damages as an attack on public wrongs of
see Carroll v. Brown, No. 80-C-6251 (N.D. Il. Nov. 25, 1988) OVESTLAW, Allfeds) (first
and third factors of test indicate that RICO is penal in nature); Eliasen v. Hamilton, No.
81-C-123 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 1987) (WESTLAW, Alifeds) (treble damages do not compensate
the individual for harm suffered, but rather serve as a deterrent and are penal in nature);
City of Chicago v. North Austin Inv. Corp., No. 85-C-0441 (Dec. 24, 1985) (WESTLAW,
Allfeds) (object of statute is clearly to inflict a punishment on the violator and therefore it
is penal).
163. No. 86-Civ-3264 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds).
164. Id., slip op. at 2.
165. Id.
166. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918, vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
167. Id. at 114041.





organized crime and therefore the "public" aim of the statute makes those
damages in excess of actual damages penal. 170
The rationale in Abell falls between the Summers decision and the Caton
decision. The Abell decision, however, is an ill-founded attempt at com-
promise. If Congress intended for civil RICO to merely compensate vic-
tims, it would have limited recovery to actual damages. To say that
Congress enacted a treble damage statute to provide one-third compen-
sation and two-thirds punishment takes intent one step too far. Further-
more, under RICO, the imposition of treble damages is mandatory. Thus,
courts have no discretionary power to modify the damage award and allow
recovery of only actual damages. One court, declining to assess RICO
treble damages against an estate, remarked: "As a court and not a
legislature, we cannot alter RICO to permit plaintiffs to bring their RICO
claim for actual damages only.'
' 71
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the hybrid nature of RICO
treble damages,'7 2 the hybrid nature is not within the damage provision
itself, but rather is found in the purpose and application of the damage
provision as a whole. To split treble damages into thirds and characterize
each third is to undermine the very purpose of treble damages.173 Either
the action can be brought or it cannot. The judiciary is not authorized to
allow the action and then decide to make mandatory treble damages
discretionary. 74 If Congress had intended this to be done, it would have
enacted two damage provisions: one allowing for compensatory damages
and one entitling the party to punitive damages. In fact, recent RICO
reform bills take this very approach. 75
Though applying the same three Murphy factors, courts have reached
contradictory pronouncements, thus revealing their inclination to apply
these factors in a result-oriented manner. Summers disregarded the re-
medial characteristics of treble damages because the court believed that
assessment of treble damages would merely serve to punish depositors and
creditors instead of the failed bank itself. 7 6 In Caton, the court found it
necessary to characterize treble damages as remedial, because otherwise
170. Id.
171. First Interstate Bank of Nevada No. 80-C-6401, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10,
1985) ,VESTLAW, Allfeds).
172. See discussion supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
173. In the context of determining the appropriate statute of limitations to be applied to
a treble damage action, some courts hold that the remedial elements of the claim can be
separated from the penal elements of the claim and the appropriate statute of limitations
applied to each. See, e.g., Carlson v. McCoy, 566 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Colo. 1977). The issue
of characterization of treble damages for statute of limitations purposes is now moot. A
uniform four year statute of limitations applies in all civil RICO actions. See Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
174. An award of RICO treble damages is mandatory. See supra text accompanying note
24.
175. See, e.g., H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
176. Summers v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
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the racketeering victim could not recover from the wrongdoer's estate. 77
The court in Massey, recognizing the penal nature of treble damages, was
persuaded that public policy prohibited penalizing innocent taxpayers for
the wrongdoings of corrupt city officials. s7 These variant results illustrate
the need for uniform decisions which award treble damages only where
both the penal and remedial purposes are given effect.
B. Estate Liability Outside the RICO Context
In contexts other than RICO, the three part Murphy test has led to
divergent results as well. For example, in Wood v. First National Bank &
Trust Co., 79 the Fifth Circuit determined that a section 130 claim under
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is remedial and therefore survives the
death of a debtor. 80 In Wood, the court had to first decide whether
damages under TILA are remedial in order to resolve whether an action
for TILA damages is transferrable to a trustee in bankruptcy.
Referring to Porter v. Household Finance Corp., 181 the court stated that
the main goal of section 130, a type of social welfare legislation unknown
at the time of Huntington, is remedial.8 2 The multiple damage award is
meant to encourage debtors to bring claims and to liquidate uncertain
actual damage."' The award is not meant to serve primarily as punishment
imposed by the state for wrongdoing.8 4
The reasoning employed in Wood resembles that used in Caton. How-
ever, one important distinction must be drawn. The TILA statute sets a
minimum recovery of $100 and a maximum of $1000.15 Therefore, under
TILA, recovery cannot be said to be disproportionate to the harm suffered.
In United States v. Edwards,'86 the District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee applied the Murphy test to determine whether the
civil penalty provisions of the Clean Water Act were penal and, therefore,
did not survive the death of the alleged wrongdoer. The United States
177. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 682 (N.D.
Ind. 1982).
178. Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 86-87 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
179. 643 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1980).
180. Wood, 643 F.2d at 193.
181. 385 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
182. Wood, 643 F.2d at 192.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Section 16401a) provides in part:
Except as oth.rwise provided in this section, any creditor who falls to comply
with any requrement imposed under this part or part D or E of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the
sum of -
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction . . ., except that the liability under
this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000 ....
Truth in Lending Act, § 130(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1988).




sued the defendant's estate for damages caused by his unlawful construc-
tion activity, which resulted in damages to wetlands. The court concluded
that the civil penalty provisions of the Clean Water Act are penal and do
not survive the death of the wrongdoer. 87
First, the court decided that the wrong the government sought to redress
under the act is one to the public, not to any particular person.' a Second,
any civil penalty would be paid to the government, not to any individual. 8 9
The third factor of the Murphy test, whether recovery is disproportionate
to the harm suffered, presented considerably more difficulty. The court
ignored this third prong by deciding that the value of destroyed wetlands
is not easily ascertainable. 90 Because any amount awarded would arguably
be too little or too much, the third factor was not critical to the decision.1 91
These cases represent a small sampling of the problems created by courts'
continued reliance on the Murphy test as a means of labeling the treble
damage provision of RICO. In the RICO context, the inconsistent results
can be eliminated once courts, instead of focusing on a label, focus on
ascertaining the effects of the award and determining whether the dual
purposes of the treble damage provision will be achieved.
V. Congressional Reform
During recent years, Congress' numerous attempts at RICO reform have
failed. 92 The proposals, as one commentator observed, "have been daz-
zling in their complexity and confusion."' 93 But all share one common
denominator: an attempt to limit the applicability of civil RICO. These
reform bills seek to limit the applicability of civil RICO in part by limiting
the availability of treble damage awards. Recovery of treble damages is
allowed only to certain types of plaintiffs. In addition, many of these
reform bills add a discretionary award of punitive damages.
House Bill 1046, the RICO Reform Act of 1989, exemplifies this ap-
proach. 94 Under this bill, attorneys' fees and treble damages are eliminated
for all but a minority class of plaintiffs. Only states and municipalities
injured in their business or property are entitled to the current treble
187. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. at 1213.
188. Id.
189. Id. The Edwards court pointed out that this factor distinguished a civil action brought
under the Clean Water Act from antitrust, securities fraud and truth in lending actions
where the penalty survives the wrongdoer's death and the recovery is paid to the injured
party and not to the government. Id.
190. Id. at 1214.
191. Id. It should be noted that the very fact that damages are hard to ascertain has been
a factor justifying treble damages in various other contexts. See, e.g., supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 651, 652 n.3 (1990).
193. Id. at 656 & n.41.
194. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.'(1989).
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damage and attorneys' fee awards. 95 For most private citizens however,
attorney's fees and treble damages are eliminated.
96
Instead, this class of plaintiffs is entitled to punitive damages up to
twice the amount of actual damages if, by clear and convincing evidence,
plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with malice. 197 This attempt by
the Congress to limit availability of treble damages, and to add a separate
provision for punitive damages only for egregious conduct on the part of
the defendant, recognizes the abuse of the current treble damage provision
and the windfall to plaintiffs in numerous situations. Furthermore, the
attempted reform recognizes that only where the defendant can be punished
should damages in excess of actual damages be allowed. Thus, through
these reform measures, Congress is attempting to explicitly articulate what
has already been stated in more general terms.
Most currently, Congressman William J. Hughes introduced H.R. 1717,
the RICO Amendments Act of 1991.191 In a recently published law review
article, Hughes discussed the highlights of this bill. 9 9 With regard to the
civil RICO provision for treble damages, 200 Hughes analogized the pro-
posed reform to a judicial gatekeeper. 20' The gatekeeper is given a broad
range of discretion in deciding what conduct will be actionable under civil
RICO.
First, where the alleged civil RICO conduct has been the subject of a
criminal conviction, the action will be granted automatically. 2 2 Second,
only cases involving egregious criminal conduct may be brought, condi-
tioned on a showing that the civil suit serves a public interest. 203 Finally,
195. Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1)(A)).
196. Id. (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)(2)(A)).
197. Id. (proposed 18; U.S.C. § 1964(c)(3)).
198. H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). According to a study prepared for West
Publishing Company by the Center for Public Choice at George Mason University for
Information for Public Affairs, Inc., the odds that the bill will pass the senate floor are
16% and the house floor, 24%. (WESTLAW, Billcast Library, July 1991).
199. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. Rv. 639 (1990). The
article actually discusses the 1990 version of this bill, H.R. 5111, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990), which is identicad to H.R. 1717.
200. H.R. 1717, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). This section
provides:
Section 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following: "This subsection is an extraordinary civil remedy for certain
occurrences of criminal activities and is available only when its use clearly
serves the public interest and provides appropriate deterrence against the rep-
etition of egregious criminal conduct. For the purposes of this subsection, the
term 'egregious criminal conduct' means a pattern of criminal conduct which
was an integral part of ongoing redeterring activities and which was character-
ized by a combination of aggravating circumstances that renders the defendant's
conduct more reprehensible than the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a
violation of section 1962 of this title. . .
Id.
201. Hughes, supra note 199, at 647.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 646-47.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss2/5
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only cases which meet a preliminary finding of the following conditions
will be allowed to advance: (1) the remedy is appropriate because there
has been significant loss to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's conduct was
central to the harm; and (3) the remedy is needed to deter criminal
conduct.
2o4
Hughes' approach is based on the legislative history of RICO. Hughes
interprets this legislative history to establish plainly that RICO's first and
foremost purpose is to entice the public to bring private attorneys general
suits and, consequently, to aid the government in prosecuting criminal
conduct. 2 5
Clearly, Hughes' statements lend strong support to the argument that
RICO treble damages, in their current state, do in part act as a penalty
and do redress harms to the public. Hughes' proposed bill further sub-
stantiates the dual purposes of a treble damage award. In fact, Hughes'
legislative reform leans quite heavily in the direction of addressing public
wrongs and, therefore, toward a characterization that RICO treble damages
serve more as a penalty.
VI. Conclusion
Both the current RICO provisions and proposed RICO reforms support
the position that because the imposition of treble damages on an estate
would punish innocent heirs, and not the wrongdoer, the claim for treble
damages should not be allowed. In such instances, only the remedial
purpose of the treble damage award is served. Congress intended the treble
damage award to accomplish the dual goals of compensation and punish-
ment. Where both of these goals are not accomplished, the claim for
treble damages must fail.
At present, the most equitable resolution of this issue is to allow the
plaintiff to recover only actual damages from the RICO violator's estate.
However, because Congress intended treble damages to serve both a penal
and a remedial purpose, allowing only actual damages to be recovered
runs contrary to this intent and to the mandatory imposition of treble
damages. To counter this problem, Congress needs to reform the RICO
treble damage provision in one of two ways. First, Congress should
redefine the purpose to be served by the treble damage provision as being
solely remedial. If Congress amends the statute in this manner, a treble
damage action could be brought against the estate of an alleged RICO
violator. Alternatively, Congress should revise the treble damage provision
and provide for recovery of only compensatory damages where a RICO
action is brought against the alleged RICO violator's estate. 206
204. Id. at 648.
205. Id. at 648.
206. This comment has not attempted to propose reform for the RICO treble damage
provision, but rather has concentrated on how the judiciary should interpret the current
treble damage provision pending reform. For a detailed analysis of proposed RICO reform
and suggested alternatives, see generally Blakey & Perry, supra note 114, at 851, 924-78,
1991]
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Until RICO reform legislation is passed, courts are left to waffle with
the proper characterization of treble damages. Obliged to follow the lead
of the Supreme Court and hold that treble damages are "primarily re-
medial," many courts continue to disregard the fact that treble damages
are punitive. Many valid claims to preclude imposition of treble damages
thus have been barred at the outset. A need exists for courts to respect
the intent of Congress by recognizing that treble damages serve a dual
purpose. Only in those cases where this dual purpose is effectuated can a
claim for RICO treble damages prevail. Until such time as Congress decides
to more explicitly denominate the aims of the civil RICO provision, courts
are bound by this duality.
Melanie J. Jester
1049-101; Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 769,
802-03 (1990).
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